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For I have known them all already, known them all:
Have known the evenings, mornings, afternoons,
I have measured out my life with coffee spoons;
I know the voices dying with a dying fall
Beneath the music from a farther room.
So how should I presume?'
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, middle-class and upper middle-class elderly Ameri-
cans voluntarily impoverish themselves in order to obtain the govern-
ment benefit known as Medicaid. "Medicaid planning," as this widely
discussed estate planning technique is known, has several variations and
is highly controversial. 2 Congress was so incensed by the practice of
t Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I wish to thank Clark Miller,
William Kirsch, Ben Miller and Sheldon Vincenti for their valuable comments on earlier drafts
of this article.
1 THOMAS STEARNS ELIOT, THE LoVESONG OF J. ALFRED PRUFROCK, lines 49-54, in
PRUFROCK AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS (1917).
2 Searches of Westlaw and Lexis produce hundreds of relevant documents. The Practic-
ing Law Institute, the American Law Institute, and various state bar associations have pub-
lished dozens of "how to" publications in this area. E.g., MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, INC., ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE AGING OR INCAPACITATED CLIENT IN MASSA-
CHUSET-rS: PROTECTING LEGAL RIGHTS, PRESERVING RESOURCES, AND PROVIDING HEALTH
CARE, (2002). Likewise, lawyers, scholars and students have written reams about the topic.
For a sampling of the leading treatments, see ERIC M. CARLSON, LONG-TERM CARE ADVO-
CACY (Matthew Bender & Co. 1999); Cynthia M. Brubaker, Medicaid Eligibility: Planningfor
the Elderly Client, 26 U. BALT. L.F. 15 (1995); Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning by the
Elderly: A Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 1 (1989); Hal Fliegelman & Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians the Power to Do
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voluntary impoverishment to obtain Medicaid that it made it a crime both
for citizens to practice it and for lawyers to advise their clients how to do
so. 3 Anger over this "Granny Goes to Jail" Act led Congress to amend
the statute, specifically repealing the portions that targeted the elderly.4
Likewise, courts have rejected the statute as it targets lawyers. 5 There
remains, however, a variety of moral, legal, and policy controversies sur-
rounding the practice of voluntary impoverishment.
The primary reason for the emergence of voluntary impoverishment
as an estate planning technique is the increasing likelihood that one's life
will end in a lengthy stay in a nursing home or with the use of skilled
Medicaid Planning, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1997); Jason A. Frank, The Necessity of
Medicaid Planning, 30 U. BALT. L.F. 29 (1999); A. Frank Johns, Legal Ethics Applied to
Initial Client-Lawyer Engagements in Which Lawyers Develop Special Needs Pooled Trusts,
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 47 (2001); Harry S. Margolis, A Proposal for Reform of Medicaid
Rules Governing Coverage of Nursing Home Care, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 303 (1998); Jan
Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent Long-Term Care Policy, 12 J.L. &
POL. 195 (1996); Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabili-
ties: The Development of a Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91
(2000); Michael Wytychak Ill, Payment of Nursing Home Bills Through the Medicaid Pro-
gram, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 243 (2000); Michael Farley, Note, When "I Do" Becomes "I Don't":
Eliminating the Divorce Loophole to Medicaid Eligibility, 9 ELDER L.J. 27 (2001); Kenneth
Hubbard, Note, The Medicaid Cost Crisis: Are There Solutions to the Financial Problems
Facing Middle-Class Americans Who Require Long-Term Health Care?, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
627 (1995); Kristin A. Reich, Note, Long-Term Care Financing Crisis-Recent Federal and
State Efforts to Deter Asset Transfers as a Means to Gain Medicaid Eligibility, 74 N.D. L.
REv. 383 (1998); see also Ralph J. Moore, Jr. & Ron M. Landsman, Planning for Disability,
816 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (2000) [hereinafter Planning for Disability], and the sources cited
therein at C-4 to C-8.
3 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 217,
110 Stat. 2008 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (1996)); Balanced Budget
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4734, 111 Stat. 522. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b(a) (1997)).
4 See Planning for Disability, supra note 2 and the sources cited therein for a more
detailed discussion of these provisions. See also Lisa Schreiber Joire, After New York State
Bar Association v. Reno: Ethical Problems in Limiting Medicaid Estate Planning, 12 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 789, 801 (1999).
5 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710, 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). Though At-
torney General Reno declared that the Department of Justice would not enforce the statute, the
court nonetheless granted plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Attor-
ney General from acting on the statute. Id. at 713, 716. In a letter dated March 11, 1998 to the
Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, Attorney General Reno advised that the provision "is
plainly unconstitutional under the First Amendment." Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y
Gen., to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the U.S. H.R. (March 11, 1998), at http://www.seniorlaw.
com/reno.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2003). For further discussion of Reno, see Joire, supra
note 4, at 803.
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nursing care in the home.6 The costs of these forms of "long-term care' 7
are so great that they can easily consume one's entire savings during the
last years of life.8 This poses two problems for the elderly. First, they
may finish their lives utterly impoverished and completely dependent on
the government or their families for their support. This problem may be
especially acute for married couples, as the healthy spouse may be im-
poverished by the costs of caring for an ailing partner many years in
advance of the healthy spouse's death. 9 Second, despite a lifetime spent
building an estate of some consequence, these elderly persons may die
with nothing to leave to their loved ones.'
Voluntary impoverishment can ameliorate both of these problems.
By giving one's fortune to family members or by putting one's property
in specially designed trusts, the now-impoverished person may qualify
for Medicaid, a means-tested government subsidy of long-term health-
care needs." Family members or the trust may provide additional sup-
port (from the transferred resources) to the impoverished person in order
to help him or her maintain a reasonable quality of life.' 2 For this rea-
son, some commentators describe this as "artificial impoverishment."'' 3
Most of the voluntarily impoverished person's assets eventually pass to
his or her loved ones. 14 Thus, when planned successfully, 15 voluntary
6 This has been attributed to "the aging of America, the technological revolution, the
commodification of health care, spiraling health care costs and the atomization of the family
unit." Jan Ellen Rein, Book Review, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 771, 771 (1999-2000). People
are living longer and "[t]he prevalence of disability rises steeply with age." ALICE M. RIVLIN
& JOSHUA M. WIENER, CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY: WHO WILL PAY? 5 (The Brook-
ings Inst. 1988) [hereinafter CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY].
7 "The need for long-term care is often measured in terms of the extent to which an
individual requires assistance in performing basic 'activities of daily living' (ADLs) such as
bathing, dressing, toileting, or eating .... Mark Merlis, Financing Long-Term Care in the
Twenty-First Century: The Public and Private Roles 3 (1999), at http://www.cmwf.org (last
visited Aug. 23, 2003).
8 See infra Part III.
9 Rochelle Bobroff, Judicial Deference to Federal Government Erodes Medicaid Pro-
tections for Elderly Spouses Impoverished by the High Costs of Nursing Home Care, 29 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 159, 161-66 (2002). As will be discussed infra Part II, Congress has made
some minimal effort to insulate the healthy spouse from the costs associated with the long-
term care needs of the unhealthy spouse.
10 See infra Part III.
II See infra Part IV.
12 But see infra Part V for a discussion of the problems and risks this may entail for the
elderly person.
13 Timothy L. Takacs & David L. McGuffey, Medicaid Planning: Can It Be Justified?
Legal and Ethical Implications of Medicaid Planning, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1l1, 131
(2002) [hereinafter Medicaid Planning Justified]. Other, more cynical, terms that have been
used are "the false poor," "the fake poor" and "paper paupers." Rein, supra note 2, at 230.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 Careful planning will include an effort to evade the government's attempts to recover
from the estate or the trust of the beneficiary any Medicaid benefits paid on the deceased's
behalf. See infra Part IV.
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impoverishment can preserve the disabled elderly person's quality of life,
while also preserving her estate, by shifting most of the person's long-
term health care costs to the government. 16
This article considers the practice of voluntary impoverishment to
obtain government benefits from both practical and policy perspectives.
It proceeds to suggest some resolutions to the controversies surrounding
the practice and some ways to improve the situation for our nation's eld-
erly. Finally, it advocates that Congress adopt a well-documented mid-
dle path between the present law and universal elder health care. 17 This
middle path would continue means testing eligibility for long-term
healthcare subsidization but limit the means testing to a set period of
approximately two years after the person has entered long-term care. Af-
ter the means testing period has expired all elderly persons in need of
long-term health care would be eligible for government assistance with-
out regard to their means. Under this approach many, if not most, middle
and upper middle class persons would elect to maintain control over their
life savings despite bearing substantial medical costs because they would
be assured that a lengthy nursing home stay will not consume all of their
income and savings and have the effect of impoverishing them and disin-
heriting their survivors. This article posits that most persons would elect
to bear the costs of their long-term care for a limited period because most
people find the idea of voluntary impoverishment repugnant and shame-
ful and because the practice imposes a high cost on personal financial
security. The cost to the government of the middle path would be rela-
tively modest because most nursing home stays do not last much more
than two years and because the path would weaken the incentives for
voluntary impoverishment. Moreover, the middle path would encourage
the practice of purchasing bridging, or mid-term, health care insurance
policies to cover nursing home costs for the means testing period. Mid-
term care insurance would be less costly than long-term care insurance
and, thus, would be more successful in obtaining favor with the buying
public. Finally, the middle path preserves the values of self-reliance and
self respect for many of our nation's elderly without forcing them to
sacrifice all of their lives' savings to do so.
I. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MEDICAID
Medicaid came into existence in 1965 as part of the Social Security
Act of that year.' 8 It is "a cooperative federal-state program funded in
16 See infra Part IV.
17 See infra Part VII.
18 Medicaid was established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act on Medical Assis-
tance, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1396a-v (1964)). The statute was subse-
quently amended in 1973 and 1984. A description of the events leading up to the enactment of
[Vol. 13:81
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large part by the federal government and administered by the states."' 19
Medicaid pays for long-term care 2° for needy elderly and disabled per-
sons. The federal bureaucracies that oversee Medicaid and its sister pro-
gram, Medicare, 2' are known as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), a division of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS). 22 Because the states are the primary administering bodies,
there is considerable variation in the program across the country. There
are, however, federal regulatory guidelines which must be met. 23
Chiefly, an applicant must be at least age sixty-five,24 continuously con-
fined to a medical institution for more than 30 days, and financially
needy in order to qualify for Medicaid.25
Financial eligibility for Medicaid assistance is determined by refer-
ence to assets and income.26 In many states, an applicant's income can-
not exceed 300% of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefit
amount. 27 In other states, one can qualify for Medicaid assistance if
one's income is less than one's medical costs even if one's income ex-
ceeds the guideline just described. 28 The applicant's assets "must not
exceed those applicable to SSI applicants. '29 Not all of an applicant's
assets are counted for SSI or for Medicaid purposes, however. Excluded
assets include the applicant's home, car, and household goods. 30 The
applicant's non-excluded or "countable" assets must be "spent down" to
Medicare and Medicaid may be found on the website of the federal agency that oversees both
programs, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), at http://cms.hhs.gov/
about/history/ssachr.asp. CMS is a division of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).
19 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 123 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 289 n.L (1985)).
20 As used throughout this article, long-term care includes both nursing home type care
and skilled nursing care in the recipient's home.
21 Medicare is the acute care analogue to Medicaid, but with some notable differences.
The principal difference is that Medicare is not means tested. Instead it is universally available
to the elderly, though Part B of Medicare involves payment of a fee. For a description of
Medicare, see KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION, 42.02
(1997 & Supp. 2003).
22 This agency's website may be found at http://cms.hhs.gov/.
23 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-63.
24 Non-elderly disabled persons may also qualify for Medicaid support. Their circum-
stances are outside the scope of this article.
25 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 126-27 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 416.1005 (2001).
26 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-63.
27 Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 416.1005 (2001). Three times the SSI benefit amounts to ap-
proximately $1600 a month.
28 Rein, supra note 2, at 214-15.
29 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 127.
30 Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 416.1210 (2001)).
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Medicaid's resource limit in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits.
Medicaid's resource limit in most states is about $2,000. 3 1
If, instead of spending down his assets, an applicant chooses to vol-
untarily impoverish himself by gratuitously transferring his assets to his
children or other loved ones, the applicant will encounter various "look
back period" rules. 32 These rules impose periods of ineligibility based
on the dollar value of those gratuitous transfers that occurred during the
look back period. 33 The general look back period is thirty-six months. 34
For transfers to a trust, however, the look back period is usually sixty
months. 35 There are exceptions to the Medicaid ineligibility penalties
imposed by the look back period rules.36 The most important exception
for planning purposes is for certain transfers to or for the benefit of a
spouse. 37 Because of the complexity of the look back period rules, vol-
untary impoverishment to obtain Medicaid benefits without the assis-
tance of a lawyer has been likened to "walking through a minefield
blindfolded." 38 The rules governing transfers into trusts are particularly
complex and are intended to severely limit the utility of such transfers
from a Medicaid eligibility standpoint.39 Those trusts that do permit the
applicant to qualify for Medicaid eligibility are typically subject to provi-
sions that require that the trust assets remaining after the applicant's
death be used to pay back the government for the Medicaid expenditures
on behalf of the decedent.40
Various provisions were enacted by Congress in 198841 and refined
in 199342 to minimally protect the healthy spouse, or "community
spouse," from being impoverished by the long-term care costs of the un-
healthy spouse, or "institutionalized spouse."' 43 These spousal protection
rules create some exceptions to the general Medicaid income rules and
31 Id.
32 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (c) (2000).
33 These and related rules were tightened considerably in the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1993 in an effort to reduce the opportunities to use voluntary impoverishment to
qualify for Medicaid. See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-79; see also Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 § 13611(e) (1993);
Reich, supra note 2, at 389.
34 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
35 Id.
36 For a comprehensive list of the exceptions see Medicaid Planning Justified, supra
note 13, at 127-28.
37 See id. at 128.
38 Id. at 127.
39 See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-70-74.
40 Id.
41 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683
(1988).
42 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
43 Bobroff, supra note 9, at 169-70.
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the spend down rules. In general, these rules protect the community
spouse's separate income and one half of the spouses' joint income from
factoring into the Medicaid eligibility of the institutionalized spouse. 44
The rules guarantee the community spouse a minimum amount of in-
come known as the minimum monthly needs allowance (MMNA). 45
These rules also allocate the spouses' countable assets between them on
a 50-50 basis without regard to who holds actual title. As with joint
income, the community spouse is entitled to a minimum amount of assets
known as the Community Spouse Resource Allowance (CSRA).46 The
CSRA also has a limit. 47 The community spouse's share of the counta-
ble assets in excess of the CSRA limit and the institutionalized spouse's
half of the countable assets must be spent down before Medicaid eligibil-
ity is attained. 48  On the whole, these rules are not particularly
generous. 49
Upon the death of an elderly Medicaid recipient, federal law re-
quires the state to seek to recover some of the Medicaid payments made
on the decedent's behalf from the decedent's estate.50 This "estate re-
covery" can be made against assets that were not counted to determine
Medicaid eligibility, including the decedent's home.51 Several states
have resisted engaging in estate recovery actions. At least one state has
unsuccessfully argued in court that the estate recovery law is unconstitu-
tional.52 As a result of the estate recovery rule, even a Medicaid recipi-
ent who owns substantial excluded assets may have nothing to leave to
his or her heirs once the government has recovered its payments. By
44 Id. at 171-72; Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-65.
45 In 2002 the minimum MMNA was $1,493 and the maximum MMNA was $2,232.
Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at B-220 1. Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-
65.
46 Bobroff, supra note 9, at 171-72; Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-68. In
2003, the minimum CSRA was $18,132. Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at B-2201.
47 See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-68. In 2003, the maximum CSRA was
$90,660. Id. at B-2201.
48 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5(c) (2000); see Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-68; see
also Farley, supra note 2, at 37.
49 See Rein, supra note 2, at 217-19. In 2002 the minimum MMNA was $1,493 and the
maximum MMNA was $2,232. In 2003 the minimum CSRA was $18,132 and the maximum
CSRA was $90,660. Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at B-2201.
50 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 129 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B)
(1994)). For a useful description of these rules and the cases interpreting them, see Janel C.
Frank, How Far is Too Far? Tracing Assets in Medicaid Estate Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REv.
111, 117-38 (2003).
51 But estate recovery cannot be brought against the home if the decedent's spouse or
underage child still resides there. Brubaker, supra note 2, at 22.
52 W. Va. ex rel. McGraw v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 289 F.3d 281 (4th
Cir. 2002).
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some accounts, estate recovery rules have caused many poor people to
decline to seek Medicaid assistance for fear of losing their homes. 53
Given the difficulty of qualifying for Medicaid through voluntary
impoverishment and the draconian effects of the estate recovery rules,
one might wonder why people nonetheless engage in the practice. The
answers lie in the punishing costs of long-term care and in the planner's
sleight of hand.
II. THE COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE
As with any discussion of medical costs in this country, we must
begin by recognizing that we are talking about a moving target. This is
especially true with respect to medical costs for the elderly, which for
decades have routinely increased at rates far above the general rate of
inflation. 54 Moreover, the number of elderly persons needing long-term
care is growing rapidly. 55 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) esti-
mates that "inflation-adjusted expenditures for long-term care for the eld-
erly will grow annually by 2.6 percent between 2000 and 2040. Those
expenditures are projected to reach $207 billion in 2020 and $346 billion
in 2040."56 There are many reasons for these cost increases and also
many feasible approaches toward limiting costs. 57 For present purposes,
however, what this means for each individual is that the costs of long-
term health care pose the single greatest financial risk of old age.58
In 2003, the average annual cost for a nursing home stay in this
country was estimated at approximately $60,000. 59 Based on past expe-
53 See, e.g., Rein, supra note 2, at 225-27.
54 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 119 n.38 (citing Mark P. Doescher et
al., Supplemental Insurance and Mortality in Elderly Americans, 9 ARCHIVES OF FAMILY
MEDICINE (2000), at http://archfami.ama-assn.org/issues/v9n3/ffull/foc9O54.html).
55 "The large number of baby boomers will begin to reach age 65 in 2011, swelling the
ranks of the elderly. In addition, more elderly people will reach advanced ages (85 and older)
than in the past because of declining mortality rates. Those trends will cause the proportion of
the population that is elderly, which was just under 13 percent in 1995, to rise to 20 percent in
2040. More important, the population over age 85-the segment most likely to require long-
term care-will grow to over three times its current size by 2040." CONo. BUDGET OFFICE,
PROJECTIONS OF EXPENDITURES FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY 1 (March
1999) [hereinafter PROJECTIONS OF EXPENDrURES], at http://www.cbo.gov. See also Janice
Cooper Pasaba & Alison Barnes, Public-Private Partnerships and Long-Term Care: Time for
a Re-Examination?, 26 STETSON L. REV. 529, 532 (1996).
56 PROJECTIONS OF EXPENDITURES, supra note 55, at 4.
57 See Rein, supra note 2, at 306-11 (describing some of the reasons for escalating costs,
including increased number of patients, inflation, fraud, provider control of the cost structure,
federal mandates, and rising reimbursement levels).
58 Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 719, 719 (1991).
59 Kelly Greene, Nursing Home Costs are Climbing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2003, at D8.
This article reports on two recent national cost surveys, one by MetLife Inc. and the other by
General Electric Co. The MetLife survey estimated average annual nursing home costs at
[Vol. 13:81
VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT
rience, that figure can be expected to grow rapidly over time. To illus-
trate, between 1977 and 1999 the average annual charge for a nursing
home stay rose from $8,268 to $46,692, an almost six-fold increase.60
The income of elderly persons does not match up well against these
costs. In 1999, more than half of all households headed by persons over
the age of sixty-five had less than $25,000 in annual income. 61 Even
when we focus on the wealthier segment of the elderly population, the
cost of a lengthy nursing home stay represents a formidable and poten-
tially disastrous expense. 62 In 1999, among those persons aged fifty-five
to seventy-four who owned stocks and other securities, the median level
of income was $53,000 and the median value of their financial assets was
$200,000.63 For those equity owners aged seventy-five and over, the me-
dian income was $30,000 and the median value of their financial assets
was again $200,000. 64 Because the risk of entering a nursing home in-
creases with age while household income generally decreases with age, it
is apparent that most elderly persons will not be able to cover the full
costs of a nursing home stay with income alone. 65 Instead, spend-down
of savings will likely begin right away. This is particularly true if there
is a spouse or other family member who must share the income and other
resources in question. In such circumstances even a person with $40,000
or $50,000 of annual income and a home that is paid for could reasona-
bly anticipate spending down $25,000 to $35,000 or more each year that
$66,000. The GE Survey estimated those costs at $57,700. The article also reports that home
care costs $18 an hour. At that rate, constant care at home for a year would cost $183,960.
See also Bobroff, supra note 9, at 162 (estimating average annual nursing home costs at over
$50,000 in 2002). The costs of nursing home stays vary by geographic region and by institu-
tion size but are always substantial. See also NAT'L. CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
HEALTH, U.S. Table 124 (2001), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hu.PDF (hereinafter CENTER
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS). Even in the early nineties, nursing homes cost as much as $100,000
annually in places such as New York City. Rein, supra note 2, at 210.
60 NAT'L. CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 59, at Table 123.
61 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME Table 13
(1999) (Income Distribution Measures by Definition of Income), at www.census.gov/prod/
2000pubs/p60-209.pdf (hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU). There are many ways to define
and measure income. I have used here one of the higher measures, money income less taxes
but including capital gains and earned income credit. Other measures yield similar but lower
numbers for median household income of those over age 65. See id. at Table 7 (Median
Income of People by Selected Characteristics: 1999, 1998, and 1997) (calculating median in-
come for 1999 at $19,079); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S. Table 663 (2001) (Money Income of Households-Distribution by Income level and Se-
lected Characteristics: 1999) (calculating median income at $22,812).
62 See Frank, supra note 2, at 30-32 (1999).
63 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: INCOME, EXPENDITURES,
& WEALTH No. 663 (2001) (Money Income of Households-Distribution by Income Level &
Selected Characteristics), at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002.pdf.
64 Id.
65 See CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 9-11.
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they are in long-term care66 if they do not find some way to qualify for
Medicaid. 67
That spend-down begins immediately for most people is supported
by the fact that "[a]pproximately seventy percent of nursing home re-
sidents rely on Medicaid to help pay for their nursing home care. '" 68 This
represented more than one million people in 1996.69 Since these per-
sons, by definition, must be impoverished in order to qualify for Medi-
caid, we can deduce one of three things about each of these persons: (1)
they were poor to begin with; (2) they spent down their assets; or, (3)
they voluntarily impoverished themselves in order to qualify for Medi-
caid. Unfortunately we do not know how many fall into that last
category. 70
66 This simple estimate is much more optimistic than other projections along this line. In
one such projection the authors posit spend down at the rate of $65,000 a year for a retired
couple with $500,000 in assets, $30,000 of income and long-term care costs of $45,000. See
Mark E. Battista & Brigette Emmons-Touchette, Covering the Financial Risk of Long-Term
Care: Responding to the Myths, 1 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 175, 183 (1997) (emphasizing the
need for long-term care insurance, though it is noteworthy that the authors appear to be in-
volved in the business of selling such insurance).
67 The income and resources of the nursing home elderly have been depicted as dramati-
cally less than the circumstances described supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. See
Rein, supra note 2, at 255-56 (arguing that Medicaid planning could not have been rampant
in the 1980's and early 1990's since the people who occupy nursing homes have little in the
way of income or assets to shelter). The generations approaching old age now are wealthier
than their predecessors. Moreover, Medicaid planning is rational behavior, even for those with
relatively few assets. Thus, even if Medicaid planning was not widespread in the past, it is
likely to become so in the future.
68 Bobroff, supra note 9, at 162. Another source states that, in 1999, 60% of expendi-
tures for nursing home care came from government, mostly from Medicaid (47%) and Medi-
care (10%). NAT'L. CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 59, at Table 118 (Personal
Health Care Expenditures, According to Type of Expenditure & Source of Funds).
69 Bobroff, supra note 9, at 162. According to another source, 4.7 million Medicaid
recipients in 1996 were over the age of sixty-five. This includes Medicaid recipients not in
nursing homes. See John M. Broderick, To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Congress Failed to
Stiffen Penalties for Medicaid Estate Planning, but Should the Practice Continue?, 6 ELDER
L.J. 257, 262-63 (1998).
70 It has been estimated that 20% of Medicaid nursing home expenditures arise from the
voluntary impoverishment, but few efforts seem to have been made to quantify the breadth of
the practice. See Broderick, supra note 69, at 272-73. One finds scattered comments in the
literature, often without authority, either asserting it is widespread or that it is not widespread.
See, e.g., Marilyn Moon, Long-Tern Care in the United States, THE URBAN INSTITUTE 4 (Feb.
1996), at www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/moonlt.asp ("While this abuse may not be wide-
spread, it is substantial enough to create considerable concern about fairness. And, in some
areas of the country, such as New York, the feeling is that the abuses are large and come from
those with very high incomes."). See also Joshua M. Wiener & David G. Stevenson, State
Policy on Long-Term Care for the Elderly, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS 81, 86 (May/June 1998) ("Al-
though the rhetoric surrounding the issue is passionate and all states acknowledge it is some-
what of a problem, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York were the only ANF states [a
group of 13 states] in which asset transfer was thought to be a major policy issue. It is of
particular concern in New York, where there are approximately 1,200 elder-law attorneys and
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Although we do not know the precise numbers of those who volun-
tarily impoverish themselves, we can reasonably judge that the number is
substantial and growing.7 1 This is because knowledge of the practice
among lawyers and their clients is becoming more pervasive.72 The mid-
dle class elderly have more to lose than they did in earlier times, 73 and
the practice is a rational adaptation to a system that is likely to leave
many people destitute in any event.
Moreover, dramatic upward Medicaid spending trends at the federal
level support the supposition that voluntary impoverishment is grow-
ing. 74  Between 1980 and 1990 federal Medicaid spending increased
from 14.3 billion dollars to 43.3 billion dollars, a three-fold increase.
From 1990 to 2000, expenditures leapt to 119.4 billion dollars and are
projected to reach 265.4 billion dollars by 2010. 75
The aggregate costs of long-term care in this country are enormous
and growing. In part this is due to the growing numbers of elderly in our
society, but even the costs measured on an individual basis are frighten-
ing in scope. Even people who are presently well-off in our society have
good reason to fear that a lengthy nursing home stay could destroy them
financially. It is only natural that such people turn to a Medicaid planner
for help, and the planners have been busy devising techniques to assist
the disabled elderly.
III. THE PLANNER'S LEGERDEMAIN
Planning, as that term is used by lawyers in the tax, trusts and es-
tates, and business fields, is the art of achieving the client's goals in the
where newspaper and magazine advertisements relating to asset transfer are said to be
ubiquitous.").
71 Joire, supra note 4, at 800 (citing a 1995 publication estimating that 20% of Medicaid
nursing home expenditures arose from Medicaid planning).
72 See Lawrence A. Frolik, The Developing Field of Elder Law Redur: Ten Years After,
10 ELDER L.J. 1, 3-4 (2002) (noting expansion and diversification of the field of elder law).
73 It was argued a few years ago that, on balance, the elderly did not have enough assets
to justify substantial Medicaid planning. See Rein, supra note 2, at 256. But the last two
decades have seen a rise in wealth and financial investment in this country as evidenced by the
median value of stock portfolios and mutual fund holdings. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 61, at No. 1211 (Characteristics of Equity Owners: 1999); No. 1209 (Stock Ownership by
Age of Head of Family and Family Income: 1992 to 1998); No. 1213 (Characteristics of Mu-
tual Fund Owners: 1998) (2002). The elderly also own homes, cars, and other nonfinancial
assets in very high percentages. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 61, at No. 763 (Nonfi-
nancial Assets Held by Families by Type of Asset: 1998). The baby boom generation is mov-
ing into retirement and bringing lots of assets with them. If Medicaid planning has not been
pervasive up to now, that will likely change.
74 One writer contends that the rapid rise in Medicaid costs is due to "rampant fraud on
the part of some health care providers" and extensive use of Medicaid by the middle class "due
to so-called 'divestment planning,' whereby middle-class citizens deliberately impoverish
themselves in order to become eligible for Medicaid benefits." Hubbard, supra note 2, at 630.
75 Betty W. Su, The U.S. Economy to 2010, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Table 6 (Nov. 2001).
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face of rules designed to obstruct the path. 76 Medicaid planning "helps
an applicant preserve assets, while fitting within the financial criteria for
Medicaid eligibility. '77 This often involves gratuitous transfers of prop-
erty interests to others or transfers into trust, but it can also involve trans-
muting countable assets into excluded assets and avoiding the estate
recovery rules for retained assets.78 As noted at the outset, the goals are
two-fold: first, to preserve assets in order to supplement Medicaid and
thereby maintain the elder person's quality of life until the very end, and,
second, to assure that the person's life savings are passed on to loved
ones rather than consumed by long-term health care costs. Achieving
one goal or the other is relatively easy but achieving both goals together
is more difficult. In all events this is an area where foresight, resources,
and access to good legal advice are rewarded. Thus, wealthier and more
financially sophisticated persons are likely to enjoy considerable advan-
tage over persons with less wealth and sophistication. 79 It is one of the
perversities of the rules intended to close Medicaid planning loopholes
that they are certain to be most effective against the poorest members of
the class at which they are directed. The estate recovery rules, for exam-
ple, are more likely to capture the cottages of the poor than the stately
manors of the upper middle class.80
Outright gifts more than three years before application is made for
Medicaid are disregarded for eligibility purposes. Thus, one of the sim-
plest and most widely used techniques of voluntary impoverishment is
simply to give substantial assets to one's children or other loved ones
well in advance of the actual application for Medicaid assistance in order
to avoid the look back and estate recovery rules. 8' Again, this technique
favors the more affluent person who can afford to give away assets early
on before there is any immediate concern about long-term care. A fore-
sighted variation on this technique is to purchase long-term care insur-
ance for a term that complies with the look back period rules and later,
when institutionalization looms on the horizon, to engage in aggressive
76 For an elaboration of this view, see John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity and
Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13-16
(1993).
77 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 131; see also Fliegelman, supra note 2,
at 359 (Medicaid planning means "the process of lawfully rearranging an individual's assets so
that the individual qualifies for Medicaid under the law while the assets are sheltered for use
by a spouse, children or others.").
78 See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-90.
79 It should be recognized, however, that at some indefinite level of wealth, Medicaid
planning might become more trouble than it is worth to the client.
80 As this last remark implies, it is my view that everyone ought to be permitted to leave
something to one's kith and kin. Perhaps this could take the form of a homestead exemption
from the estate recovery rules if those rules cannot be abolished entirely.
81 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-90.
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gifting away of assets. 82 The insurance, thus, serves as a funding bridge
until the look back period has expired. Another approach available to an
affluent person is to make gifts of assets while retaining enough property
to pay for long-term care until the look back period rules no longer
apply.8 3
The outright gift approach meets the asset protection goal, but may
fail to meet the quality of life goal unless the donee cooperates or unless
the donor or her spouse has other assets. For this reason, some people
prefer to make transfers into trusts, the terms of which continue to make
the assets or income available to the trust's grantor or the grantor's
spouse. 84 These trusts must be carefully drawn to limit the Medicaid
applicant's access to the trust assets; otherwise the assets will be deemed
to be owned directly by the applicant for Medicaid eligibility purposes
and may disqualify the applicant.85 Certain trusts, called Miller trusts, 86
are often used to divert income away from the Medicaid applicant when
the applicant's income is otherwise over the eligibility limit.8 7 Other
trusts may be used to create an income stream to the settlor while depriv-
ing him of any right to the principal. These income-only trusts cause the
principal to be disregarded for Medicaid eligibility purposes.88 One of
the difficulties with the use of trusts is avoidance of the estate recovery
rules. The statutorily authorized trusts, collectively known as the safe
harbor trusts, are required to have a Medicaid payback provision. 9
Sometimes the transfers described above may be carried out by the
holder of the Medicaid applicant's power of attorney rather than the ap-
plicant himself.90 The making of gifts by the power holder, especially to
him or herself, has been the subject of some controversy and abuse, espe-
cially in the tax context. 91 Although there are variations from state to
state, the emerging general rule appears to be that the power to make
82 Id. at A-88.
83 This is sometimes called the "half a loaf recipe" because that is roughly the amount
that can be given. Rein, supra note 2, at 220. For a more refined, formulaic approach to this
technique, see Fliegelman, supra note 2, at 360-61; see also Margolis, supra note 2, at 306.
84 For a detailed discussion of the use of trusts for Medicaid planning, see Planning for
Disability, supra note 2, at A-73 to A-78 & A-81 to A-82.
85 Id.
86 The trust has been so named in reference to the case establishing its viability as a
Medicaid planning device. See Miller v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990). The deci-
sion has been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(B).
87 Dennis Voorhees, Planning Medicaid Eligibility in PRACTICAL MEDICARE AND MEDI-
CAID SKILLS IN IDAHO 111-9 (2003). Transfers to trusts must be irrevocable and must occur
more than five years before the application for Medicaid to avoid being counted as assets
belonging to the applicant.
88 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-77 to A-78.
89 Id. at A-73-74, A-86.
90 Id. at A-87 to A-88.
91 See, e.g., Estate of Swanson v. U.S., 46 Fed. Cl. 388 (2000).
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gifts on the power grantor's behalf must be expressly stated in the instru-
ment.92 Given the potential for abuse, this is the appropriate direction in
which the law should develop.
A commonly employed technique known as "asset repositioning"
involves taking countable assets and turning them into excluded assets or
into an excluded income stream. 93 Simple examples include buying a
new car or making home repairs and improvements such as a new roof or
furnace. 94 In some cases these assets may later be subject to estate re-
covery, but they at least temporarily preserve the applicant's savings. 95
In addition, asset repositioning contributes to the quality of life of the
community spouse and may reduce her risk of later impoverishment
without affecting Medicaid eligibility of the institutionalized spouse.9 6
In this regard, the timing of these expenditures may be crucial in order to
maximize the community spouse's CSRA. The best time to make the
expenditures for this purpose is after admission to a nursing home and
prior to application for Medicaid. 97 This illustrates how technically com-
plex Medicaid planning is, and how important competent counsel has
become.
Asset repositioning can be regarded as a form of spend down. An-
other spend down technique involves payment for services that will be
rendered in the future, including some legal and accounting services and
funeral and burial expenses. 98 Prepayment for services makes particular
sense when the expenses are almost certain to arise at some point.
Again, from the standpoint of the community spouse's CSRA, the best
time to make the expenditures is after admission to a nursing home and
prior to application for Medicaid. 99
There are many Medicaid planning techniques available to married
persons, some of which are variations on asset repositioning. °° The
purchase of an annuity for the benefit of the healthy spouse of a potential
Medicaid applicant is one specialized technique of asset protection.' 0 ' In
effect, the applicant's resources are diverted to the spouse and converted
92 See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-9; KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE
PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION $ 43.02[i][b] (2003); Andrew H. Hook, Durable Pow-
ers of Attorney, 859 Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-24, A-27 to A-31 (2000).
93 Voorhees, supra note 87, at 111-8-9.
94 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-89; Voorhees, supra note 87, at 111-8-9.
Technically, asset repositioning is known as a "non-transfer transaction" because they are not
treated as transfers under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c).
95 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-86.
96 Voorhees, supra note 87, at 111-8-9.
97 See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-93 to A-94.
98 Id. at A-94.
99 See id. at A-93 to A-94.
100 Id. at A-94.
101 Id. at A-94-95.
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into an income stream that is excluded from consideration for Medicaid
purposes. 0 2 This technique avoids the estate recovery rules and has be-
come so widespread that it has drawn considerable fire from state and
federal authorities, to the extent that its future is now in doubt. 0
3
Another asset protection technique involving the spouse of a poten-
tial applicant is the purchase of a new home.' ° 4 It should be remembered
that the home is an exempt asset and that transfers to spouses are exempt
transfers. 05 According to one commentator, the home can be purchased
by the spouse "to qualify her husband for Medicaid" and then transferred
or sold by the spouse "post-eligibility" without affecting the applicant's
continued eligibility. 1
0 6
A technique called "spousal refusal," in which the healthy spouse
refuses to make community assets available to the institutionalized
spouse in order for the latter to qualify for Medicaid, has gained some
notoriety in New York and Maryland.' 0 7 The state theoretically has a
right of recovery against the refusing spouse, but enforcement has been
lax. 10 8
Because of the exceptions to the transfer-of-assets rules for transfers
to or for the benefit of the transferor's spouse, trusts for the benefit of a
spouse offer planning opportunities not available for self-settled trusts. 0 9
Properly drawn trusts give the spouse access to income from the trust but
not the principal, thereby avoiding inclusion of the principal in calcula-
tion of the spouse's Medicaid eligibility. 110
There are also techniques for increasing the community spouse's
community resource allowance (CSRA) or maximizing the community
spouse's income that take advantage of certain aspects of the spousal
impoverishment rules described earlier. One such technique involves us-
ing borrowing to increase the couples' combined assets temporarily for
102 Id.
103 See Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 143; Voorhees, supra note 87, at
111-18.
104 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 143.
105 There are other exempt transfers that may be useful in specific circumstances. These
include transfers to a disabled child or other disabled person, transfers of a home to a child
who has lived with the transferor for two years and provided home health care during that
period, and transfers of a home to sibling who has lived with the transferor for at least one
year. See 42 U.S.C § 1396(c)(2)(A); see also Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-84 to
A-85, A-91, & A-95 to A-96.
106 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 143.
107 See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-69 to A-70; see also Medicaid Plan-
ning Justified, supra note 13, at 143-44 and the authorities cited therein.
108 For a more detailed discussion, see Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-69 to
A-70; see also Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 143-44 and the authorities cited
therein.
109 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-76 to A-77.
1o Id.
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purposes of computing the CSRA.I' After the CSRA has been deter-
mined, the institutionalized spouse's share of the assets may be used to
pay off the liability, thereby spending down his resources to qualify him
for Medicaid.' 12
According to some commentators, divorce can also be an effective
Medicaid planning technique." 3 The strategy to follow, apparently, is to
have the decree divide the couple's property heavily in the favor of the
community spouse. 14 Since the couple is no longer married, arguably
the assets held by the now ex-spouse are not countable against the insti-
tutionalized spouse under the spousal allocation rules. Further, as the
property passes by decree rather than by gift, presumably the look back
period rules and the estate recovery rules should not apply either." 15
There are likely many other more specialized techniques available
for Medicaid planning that take advantage of particular attributes of cli-
ents or their property. For example, there may be techniques available to
farmers and ranchers 16 and small businesses that have not yet been ex-
ploited or that are being exploited by only a few. One might wonder, for
example, what use could be made of discounted sales of minority inter-
ests in closely held entities to family members or to trusts as a means to
avoid the look back period rules. For years these sorts of transfers have
been used to great advantage in the gift tax area.17 The idea is that the
interest transferred has a low fair market value relative to the value of the
property held inside the entity.' 18 The "discount" value stems from the
lack of control and marketability of the minority interest in the enter-
prise. 1 ' 9 Thus, one might sell a quarter interest in a partnership with
assets worth $1,000,000 for $150,000 rather than for its proportionate
value of $250,000, and the sale price would be regarded as representing
''' See id. at A-92 to A-93.
1 2 Id. This technique works because the CSRA ignores liabilities even when they are
incurred to acquire countable assets. It should be remembered, however, that the CSRA is
subject to a maximum; the community spouse's assets in excess of that maximum must be
spent down.
1 13 See Farley, supra note 2, at 28-31 (discussing L.M. v. State Div. Of Med. Assistance
& Health Servs., 659 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1995)); see also Wytychak, supra note 2, at 260 (sug-
gesting this technique is appropriate where the community spouse has "significant separate
property"); Fliegelman, supra note 2, at 364.
114 See Wytychak, supra note 2, at 260.
115 This is analogous to the rules that apply to the federal gift tax treatment of property
transfers in divorce. Such transfers are generally not treated as gifts. See I.R.C. § 2516. See
generally RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 10.06 (2002).
116 See Roger A. McEowen, Estate Planning for Farm and Ranch Families Facing Long-
Term Health Care, 73 NEB. L. REV. 104 (1994) (describing several interesting techniques not
widely discussed elsewhere).






full fair market value for the interest transferred. 20 No gift has occurred.
In this way, $100,000 of intrinsic value is transferred without being sub-
ject to gift tax. In the current context, $100,000 of intrinsic value would
be transferred away without triggering the look back period rules since
the transfer was for fair value received. '21 This approach also may serve
to create liquidity to pay nursing home expenses during spend down.'
22
If there is a problem with family members having the resources to make
the purchase outright, it could be structured as an installment sale.
1 23
Even if the transfer is structured as a gift, the amount of the gift is re-
duced by the discount and, thus, the period of ineligibility is reduced as
well. 124
Successful planning involves staying ahead of the regulators. More-
over, planners are often loath to disclose their techniques to the prying
eyes of their competitors.' 25 Thus, the available literature about volun-
tary impoverishment probably does not give the complete picture of what
is happening. In my experience with estate planning, I have often found
that the literature is several years behind the practice. This likely holds
true for the subject of Medicaid planning as well. Therefore, while this
rough summary of the Medicaid planner's legerdemain shows something
of what has been going on in the area of voluntary impoverishment, it
should not be taken as exhaustive. It is clear that a great deal of time,
money, and energy has gone into developing a broad array of voluntary
impoverishment techniques. This is indicative of the growing pervasive-
ness of the practice and of its increasing fiscal impact on the Medicaid
system. It also shows the pressure that middle-America is experiencing
with respect to the costs of long-term care.
120 Id. A combined discount of 40% for lack of marketability and control is not unusual.
See KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION, 16.03[l][c]
(1997).
121 The look back period rules, and the penalties they can trigger, apply to gratuitous
transfers. See Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-80.
122 This assumes the transferee makes payment in cash.
123 For a discussion of the utility and mechanics of installment sales in the estate planning
and income tax contexts, see KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVA-
TION, 30.01 et seq. (1997); Lisa Marie Starczewski, 565 T.M., Installment Sales (2002).
124 A gratuitous transfer during the look back period delays an applicant's eligibility for
Medicaid assistance. The length of the delay increases in proportion to the size of the gratui-
tous transfer. See Broderick, supra note 69, at 267-68. Thus, the larger the gift, the longer the
delay in eligibility. Therefore, by structuring her gifts to obtain discounts in the gift's value,
the donor reduces the length of delay in Medicaid eligibility engendered by the gift.
125 Tax planners are well aware that whenever a tax avoidance plan becomes too well
known the Treasury is likely to seek to shut it down. I know one prominent estate planner
(who shall remain nameless) who is so averse to publicity about his techniques that he requires
that his clients sign a non-disclosure agreement before he will plan their estates. He regards
his estate plans as something akin to trade secrets.
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IV. WHY IS THIS A PROBLEM?
Voluntary impoverishment is subject to a number of moral, philo-
sophical, political, and practical objections. In an article that seeks to
justify the practice of voluntary impoverishment, Timothy Takacs and
David McGuffey set out eight common objections to the practice. A
consolidated version of those objections is as follows:
1. Voluntary impoverishment defeats Medicaid's pur-
pose of providing for the poor and will lead to dimin-
ished medical resources for "the truly needy." Thus,
those who can afford to pay for their long-term care have
a civic duty to do so in order to preserve Medicaid bene-
fits for the truly needy.
2. Preserving peoples' inheritances is not a compelling
public interest that justifies the diversion of government
resources away from the truly needy.
3. Voluntary impoverishment, if unchecked, could
bankrupt the system.
4. Children who use powers of attorney and other
mechanisms to impoverish their parents are depriving
their parents of good care and are engaging in "elder fi-
nancial abuse."
5. Voluntary impoverishment discourages purchasing
insurance to pay for long-term care costs.126
Takacs and McGuffey sidestep these objections by asserting that
"[a]ll objections are trumped by our conclusion that the ethical implica-
tions these objections raise are irrelevant as long as Medicaid planning is
practiced in an amoral health care market, in which the only ethics that
count are those of the marketplace."' 127 They explain this view further by
asserting, "[t]o suggest that purchasers of health care services should pay
more than the minimum net cost to secure those services, merely because
they have the resources to do so, is as absurd as criticizing wealthy per-
sons for shopping at the discount store .... 28
This line of analysis recalls Judge Learned Hand's famous pro-
nouncement in the taxation context that "[a]ny one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern that will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."'129 Takacs and McGuffey's point
126 Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 132-34.
127 Id. at 135.
128 Id. at 153.
129 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934); see also Frank, supra note 2,




is that "there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's. . ." health care
costs. Stated another way, when the question of who will pay for long-
term health care is governed by a system of laws established by the gov-
ernment, the individual is entitled to structure his affairs so as to pay no
more than the law requires. 130 After all, it is the government that wrote
the rules. The government has the power, and the individual has his wits.
To deny the individual the right to use his wits (or more likely the wits of
the planner) to avoid paying for his long-term care would skew the odds
in the government's favor in what is already an uneven contest. 131
At the present time, there is a certain irony in questioning the public
benefit of preserving inheritances. Congress has recently repealed the
estate tax, effective 2010, thus relieving the wealthiest members of the
population from the burden of paying taxes on the part of their estates in
excess of the $1,000,000 that is already exempt. 132 Meanwhile, it has
raised the exemption levels to the point where by 2009 a married couple
can leave $7,000,000 to their heirs with no estate tax bill. 133 Obviously,
Congress thinks the rich are entitled to pass their wealth on to their loved
ones. This stands in stark contrast to the estate recovery rules that are
intended to strip away every last vestige of the poor man or woman's
inheritance. This must be an especially bitter pill for an heir to swallow
after, as is often the case, she 134 or he has devoted several years to giving
unpaid care to the now deceased elderly person.135
130 Frank, supra note 2, at 36-38.
131 This is a paraphrase of something I wrote a decade ago in the tax planning context.
See Miller, supra note 76, at 15. Mr. Frank's article is a classic example of the planner's point
of view. Frank takes the rules that restrict eligibility and describes their limits. Because these
rules have limits, he argues, they implicitly accept that Medicaid planning is a legitimate tech-
nique. He calls these implicit acceptances "de facto policies that militate in favor of Medicaid
planning." Frank, supra note 2, at 36-38. He also cites several cases in which the courts have
approved Medicaid planning. Id. at 40. For a philosophical justification of practices like
Medicaid planning, see Leo Katz, Form and Substance in Law and Morality, 66 U. CU.
L.REV. 566 (1999) (arguing that everyday morality is formalistic and, since law tracks every-
day morality, it is formalistic also). "Lawyers who engage in . . . [such] shenanigans [as
voluntary impoverishment planning] are simply capitalizing on the formality of the everyday
morality that underlies the law. And by the standards of that same everyday morality they are
acting perfectly defensibly." Id. at 567. See also Dobris, supra note 2, at 25 (setting out three
arguments justifying Medicaid planning: 1) a just America should not bankrupt its citizens as
the price of admission to a nursing home; 2) disallowing Medicaid planning would discourage
savings and encourage cheating; and 3) disallowing Medicaid planning undermines reasonable
expectations of inheritance).
132 See I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2003); STEPHENS, supra note 117, at$$ 1.05, 8.10[5]. The ex-
emption for married couples is effectively $2,000,000; however, with minimal planning, such
as inter vivos gifting, much more can be passed tax free. See I.R.C. §§ 2503, 2513.
133 See I.R.C. § 2010(c).
134 Most often, caregivers to the elderly are women. See Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 46,
at 536 n.40, and sources cited therein.
135 See Rein, supra note 2, at 264-70 (describing the human and economic costs of pro-
viding elder care for family members).
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The objections set out above may not overcome an individual's le-
gal or moral right to engage in Medicaid planning, but at least some of
them are good reasons why the government might seek to discourage
voluntary impoverishment. After all, it is important that Medicaid be
managed in a fiscally sound manner and that the truly needy be given
adequate care. Thus, to deny the relevance of the objections from the
applicant's or the applicant's heirs perspective only shifts the argument
to a different question. Is there a fiscally prudent way to redesign Medi-
caid that reduces the incentive to engage in voluntary impoverishment?
The urgency of this question stems not only from the strains on the
Medicaid system imposed by voluntary impoverishment but also from
the strains voluntary impoverishment imposes on those who engage in it.
The objections described by Takacs and McGuffey are, for the most
part, impersonal objections. That is, these objections look at the practice
of voluntary impoverishment from the perspective of one standing
outside looking in. But there are other concerns one may articulate con-
cerning voluntary impoverishment that look at its effect on the person
who surrenders her wealth in this fashion or who considers doing so but
chooses not to. This is viewing the act of voluntary impoverishment
from the personal perspective. There are at least three objections that
arise when voluntary impoverishment is viewed from the personal
perspective.
First, the act of voluntary impoverishment leaves the person finan-
cially vulnerable and relatively defenseless. 36 For example, a person
who voluntarily impoverishes himself by outright gifts before entering a
nursing home and who is later discharged from a nursing home may be
forced to live in poverty after discharge. Moreover, for those persons
who remain institutionalized for the remainder of their lives, Medicaid
provides only the bare minimum needed to go on living. Some of the
planning devices described earlier can ameliorate some of these risks and
discomforts. However, the essential thrust of voluntary impoverishment
is to leave the person financially exposed and at the mercy of others.
That is why there is some merit to the argument that the use by a child of
a power of attorney to impoverish a parent for Medicaid eligibility pur-
poses is a form of abuse. A person living on Medicaid is living on the
edge of a financial precipice.
Second, to the average person the idea of ending up on the public
dole is utterly repulsive. Voluntary impoverishment conflicts with the
core American value of self reliance and, hence, it may feel shameful and
opportunistic. Ours is a society that places a high value on material
achievement and personal autonomy. People who have spent their whole
136 For a discussion of these and other disadvantages, see id. at 220; see also Dobris,
supra note 2, at 14-15.
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lives seeking to establish and maintain their financial and personal inde-
pendence are likely to suffer great loss of self regard after becoming
impoverished and being placed in a program explicitly labeled as for "the
needy."
Third, not only does voluntary impoverishment impose high costs in
terms of personal security and self-respect, but the spend down alterna-
tive may be just as personally destructive. This is because a person who
chooses not to engage in voluntary impoverishment may experience a
strong feeling that he has been a chump or a sucker. He may feel that
only an idiot would choose to spend his life's savings to buy something
he can have at substantially lesser cost or, possibly, for free. This sense
of having played the fool must be especially bitter for those persons who,
as is likely, spend down their assets and end up impoverished, humili-
ated, and stigmatized anyway.137 When the choice is between becoming
impoverished through spend down and becoming impoverished by gift-
ing to loved ones, the person who chooses to spend down may regard
himself as having been stupidly honorable at the expense of those who
matter most to him or her. 138 Moreover, by gifting away assets that are
destined to be lost anyway, the donor can at least hope to gain the do-
nee's goodwill. By engaging in spend down, however, that opportunity
is lost. Thus, the person who chooses to spend down may end up believ-
ing that he has deprived both himself and his loved ones out of mere
stubborn pride, and his family may feel the same way. The person who
engages in spend down pays a heavy price emotionally as well as
financially.
Thus, the present structure of the law offers a choice between being
a freeloader and an uncaring fool. In both cases, one is likely to ap-
proach life's end in circumstances of dire financial peril.' 39 This is
hardly a desirable state of affairs.
Both the Medicaid system and the persons who practice voluntary
impoverishment are harmed by the practice. Both would benefit from
fiscally sound rules that make the practice unnecessary. Before setting
out a proposal that approaches this goal, it will be useful to provide some
context by briefly describing various proposals that have been offered to
finance the cost of caring for the nation's disabled elderly.
V. LONG-TERM CARE: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A number of proposals have been put forward to address the prob-
lem of funding long-term care for this country's elderly. Thus far, no
137 See Rein, supra note 2, at 269-72.
138 For a discussion of elderly America's ambiguous feelings toward Medicaid, see
Dobris, supra note 2, at 19-20.
139 See Rein, supra note 2, at 272-73.
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comprehensive plan has been adopted by Congress, though in 1996 it did
make an indirect effort to improve the situation by creating tax incentives
for the purchase of long-term care insurance.140 Thus far, these incen-
tives seem to have had little impact.' 41 As noted at the beginning of this
article, another significant reform effort by Congress has been its failed
attempt to suppress the practice of voluntary impoverishment by impos-
ing criminal sanctions. 142 Congress has been more successful in limit-
ing, but not eliminating, the utility of trusts as Medicaid planning
devices.143 Given the urgency of the problem and the creativity of the
planners, suppression of voluntary impoverishment is not a promising
course to follow. Instead what is needed is a fiscally responsible course
that creates a better alternative than voluntary impoverishment.
Congress' failure to comprehensively address the problem of fi-
nancing long-term care for the elderly has been attributed mainly to "the
apprehension of uncontrollable public expenditures if entitlement to eli-
gibility is materially expanded."' 144 This "apprehension" rests upon the
reasonable assumption that if government-financed long-term care were
more available more people would use it. 145 This phenomena, which is a
familiar one in the insurance industry, is called induced demand or
"moral hazard." 146 Sensible reform must avoid carte blanche entitlement
to publicly financed long-term care in order to avoid bankrupting the
system. 147 Thus, the central challenge of any long-term care finance plan
140 See Merlis, supra note 7, at 21-22; see generally A. Mark Christopher, New Law
Provides Ways to Reduce Tax Burdens Relating to Long-Term Care Expenses, 86 J. TAX'N 20
(1997); David M. English, New Legislation on Long-Term Care and Other Issues Affecting the
Elderly, 23 EST. PLAN. 494 (1996).
141 In 1985, 3.4% of nursing home care expenditures were paid by private insurance. By
1995, the year before Congress created new incentives for purchasing long-term care insur-
ance, the number had risen to 7.5%. In 1999, that number nudged up less than one percent to
8.4%. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATS., REPORT ON HEALTH: U.S. 2001, 333, Table 118
(2001) (Personal Health Care Expenditures). Other sources put the contributions of private
insurance at much lower levels (around I%). See, e.g., Merlis, supra note 7, at 5.
142 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
143 Planning for Disability, supra note 2, at A-70 to A-78.
144 Kapp, supra note 58, at 733.
145 Id. at 734. Despite the heavy expenditures made by the government, it is estimated
that most of the costs of long-term care for the elderly are borne by family members and
friends. See id. at 729; CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 5-6; see also
Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 55, at 536-38 (noting the insufficiency of current options for
financing long-term care). On the whole, research supports the notion that there is pent up
demand for publicly financed long-term health care for the elderly.
146 See CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 57, 66; Medicaid Planning
Justified, supra note 13, at 154.
147 See CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 12. Rivlin and Wiener set
out three other objectives of reform: (1) it should reduce uncertainty about how people will
pay for long-term care; (2) it should enable people to remain at home as long as possible; and,
(3) it should encourage efficiency, flexibility and experimentation in the delivery system. Id at
13.
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is to find the right balance between private and public expenditures in
order to control costs while seeing that care is available to all who need
it. On one hand, if public monies for long-term care are too freely avail-
able, then induced demand will likely cause the overall costs to skyrocket
out of control. 148 On the other hand, if public support is eliminated in
favor of private support, then many persons will go without care. Fi-
nally, if public support is limited but still available to the needy, then
devices such as voluntary impoverishment are likely to proliferate as
people struggle with the two concerns described at the beginning of this
article, the fear of involuntary impoverishment and the fear of disinherit-
ing one's loved ones.
Since the late 1980s, there have been a number of ideas put forward
directed at reforming long-term care financing in the private sector. The
possibility of individual medical accounts (IMAs), a variant on the indi-
vidual retirement account, has been raised. 149 Continuing Care Retire-
ment Communities (CCRCs) have established a niche market.' 50 Most
prominently, the idea of private long-term care insurance as the chief fix
for the problem has been debated. 15'
Individual Medical Accounts would give tax advantages to those
who save for long-term care. 152 Studies indicate that this mechanism is
seriously flawed as a vehicle for funding the costs of long-term care for
three main reasons. First, the amount of savings must be quite substan-
tial and must begin at an early age for those persons who end up in long-
term care. 153 Second, most of those who do save will never need the
savings since they will not enter long-term care.154 Third, those persons
most likely to fully fund such accounts are those who have the least fi-
nancial need for them. 155 Nonetheless, the idea continues to draw sup-
port in Congress. 156
Continuing Care Retirement Communities are "residential cam-
puses" that usually combine a range of living circumstances and health
services, typically including a nursing home.' 57 These graduated living
148 One reason for this is because "the predominate provider of long-term care in the
United States is the family." Id. at 5. If many or all of these family members instead seek
public assistance for long-term care, the government's costs may become unmanageable.
149 Id. at 17, 109-22.
150 Id.
15' Id. at 59-82.
152 Id. at 109.
153 Id. at 112, 122.
154 Id. at 112-13, 122.
155 See id. at 110, 113-15.
156 See Warren Rojas, House Clears Bill to Create New Tax-Preferred Savings Tools, 99
TAX NoTES 1875 (June 30, 2003) (describing a bill, passed by the House, creating Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) that could be rolled over into Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs) at age sixty-five).
157 CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 83.
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environments have many lifestyle advantages for the elderly, but they are
costly. 158 While they can be designed as risk pooling enterprises, this
has not been the trend. 159 Instead the move from assisted living to nurs-
ing home care usually involves a large monthly cost hike.' 60 Thus,
CCRC's are not primarily a financing mechanism for long-term care;
rather, they are service providers. Like IMAs, they are most likely to be
utilized by wealthier persons. 161
It appears that the most promising private-sector option for long-
term health care reform is long-term care insurance. 162 More specifi-
cally, one aspect of long-term health care for the disabled elderly makes
it particularly appropriate to address through insurance; that is, the fact
that most people will never need substantial long-term care. Though
about one in four will reside in a nursing home at some point, fewer than
five percent of our nation's elderly are in nursing homes at any one
time. 163 This means that long-term care lends itself to risk pooling
"whereby many people contribute to a fund to cover the extraordinary
expenses of the few."'164 This fact might cause one to conclude that pri-
vate insurance could solve the problem. The difficulty with relying ex-
clusively on private insurance, however, is that its affordability depends
on its purchase many years in advance of the remote possible need be-
cause the risk of needing long-term care rises steeply with age. 165
A pattern of purchasing insurance well in advance of need contra-
dicts human nature, as people are more likely to buy it only once the
need becomes more immediate. 166 At that point, "those people likely to
need long-term care insurance may buy it disproportionately, and insur-
ance companies tend to react by screening out disabled applicants."' 167
158 See id. at 83-90.
159 Id. at 83-84.
160 Id. at 83-85.
161 Id. at 84, 94, 96.
162 Id. at 81-82, 238-39.
163 Id. at 13, 122.
164 Id. at 13.
165 See Merlis, supra note 7, at 4-5 (estimating that 36% of individuals aged forty-five in
1995 can expect to spend time in a nursing home and that, while the average stay is estimated
at 2.7 years, 7-8 % will require five or more years of nursing home care). Pasaba and Barnes
argue that 43% of individuals aged sixty-five and older will reside in a nursing home, nearly a
quarter of whom will reside there for more than four years. Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 55,
at 536. See also Merlis, supra note 7, at 19-20, for a useful discussion of the nature of long-
term care insurance.
166 Merlis, supra note 7, at 13-14; Pasaba & Barnes, supra note 55, at 541. Moreover,
Rein contends that long-term care insurance is unaffordable for most people and suffers from
other problems including limited coverage, high lapse rates, inability to upgrade as policies
improve, and sales and marketing abuses. See Rein, supra note 2, at 279-92.
167 CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 210-11; see also Pasaba &
Barnes, supra note 55, at 541-43. This is known as the problem of "adverse selection." Kapp,
supra note 58, at 742.
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Perhaps with sufficient time and marketing, the need for early purchase
of long-term care insurance can be impressed upon the general popula-
tion; to date, however, this has not been the case. Moreover, one author
argues that "even the most optimistic estimates of the market for long-
term care insurance would still leave more than half of all seniors
uninsured." 168
There have also been a number of public-sector reform proposals. 169
Several of these sought to increase the government subsidy for long-term
care with an emphasis on skilled nursing care in the person's home.' 70
The emphasis on home health care comports with the preferences of the
elderly' 71 and may also prove less expensive than institutional care. 172
These approaches are akin to simply liberalizing the existing Medicaid
system which has "the political advantage that it can be accomplished
incrementally." 173
Other proposals focused on public insurance for long-term care sim-
ilar to that already provided by Medicare for acute care.'74 Many varia-
tions are possible, but the essential features are public financing with
private cost sharing and broad entitlement to benefits.' 75 As discussed
earlier, substantial private cost sharing is essential in order to provide
incentives not to abuse or over use the care system. 176 The need for
private cost sharing implies the need for continued means tested aid for
those too poor to bear any significant part of their long-term care ex-
penses. Public financing could take the form of a payroll tax like Social
Security and Medicare but need not do so. 177 The most promising of the
public sector solutions to the problem of paying for the care of the dis-
abled elderly involves a substantial private component. 78 For this rea-
son, it is called the middle path.
168 Margolis, supra note 2, at 304.
169 Kapp, supra note 58, at 736-40.
170 Id.
171 CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 148.
172 See A.E. Benjamin, Consumer-Directed Services at Home: A New Model for Persons
with Disabilities, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 81 (Nov./Dec. 2001).
173 CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 205. Margolis argues for a
number of incremental changes. See Margolis, supra note 2, at 305-09.
174 Kapp, supra note 58, at 736; see also CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note
6, at 26, 210-34; see Medicaid Planning Justified, supra note 13, at 156; see also Dobris,
supra note 2, at 25-27 (arguing for "compulsory, government sponsored insurance").
175 See CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 211.
176 See Part VI supra.
177 See Kapp, supra note 58, at 742 ("A myriad of different revenue options exist."). Our
tax system has become increasingly regressive over the past two decades and another payroll
tax would only add to this problem. Revival of wealth taxation would be a reasonable ap-
proach in this author's view Kapp views revival of wealth taxation to be a reasonable
approach.
178 See generally, CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at ch. 3 (conclud-
ing that private sector options are appealing because, among other things, they have the poten-
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VI. THE MIDDLE PATH
The main features of the middle path are set out in a book published
by The Brookings Institution entitled CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELD-
ERLY: WHO WILL PAY? 17 9 The lead authors are economists Alice M.
Rivlin' 80 and Joshua M. Wiener. Rivlin and Wiener develop economic
models for a number of different approaches to long-term care reform,
including private insurance, individual medical accounts, home equity
conversions, 18 1 and continuing care retirement communities. Their an-
nounced objective was to delineate an approach that met four main goals:
1) "reduc[ing] the uncertainty and anxiety that now surround paying for
long-term care;" 2) enabling the elderly to remain at home as long as
possible; 3) enhancing the quality, flexibility and efficiency of the deliv-
ery system; and 4) not "greatly exacerbat[ing] the expected rise in long-
term care expenditures or add to the inflationary pressures on the long-
term care industry."' 182
After analyzing various approaches, Rivlin and Wiener concluded
that the optimal approach to achieve their goals was a blend of public
and private insurance that supported home health care as well as institu-
tional care.' 83 Some of their recommendations for incremental reform
have already been adopted. These include tax incentives for purchase of
long-term care insurance and liberalized home health care rules for
Medicaid eligibility. 84 But the key thrust of their proposal, a national
public insurance program for catastrophic loss, remains to be enacted.
The essence of this proposal is to provide public subsidy of long-term
care after a long deductible period of one to two years. 185 It is implicit in
tial to reduce catastrophic health care costs, but would be most successful if combined with a
public program).
179 CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6.
180 Ms. Rivlin served as Director of the White House Office of Management and Budget
from 1994 to 1997, prior to which she was Director of the Congressional Budget Office.
181 I have not addressed this topic here. Despite some technical and social reasons why
the government should not require people to use their home equity to fund long-term care,
home equity conversions are plausible. See, e.g., CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra
note 6, at ch. 8.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 238-40.
184 See id. at 238-44; Benjamin, supra note 130, at 91 (discussing the shift in responsibil-
ity for health care for people with disabilities, including the elderly, from professionals to
recipients and how it changes the traditional home care agency model).
185 CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 245. Though I do not develop it
in this article, Rivlin and Wiener set out a second option that they find plausible: a basic long-
term care benefit, universally available to the elderly and with no deductible period. Id. at
245-46. Those persons who want additional benefits would have to pay for them privately.
Id. at 245. I decline to develop this model for two reasons. First, Rivlin and Wiener indicate
that this approach would be more expensive for the public than the middle path. Id. at 246.
Second, this two-tiered approach introduces an overt class system of care that I do not find
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this plan that there would be no estate recovery rules imposed. 186 Like
Social Security and Medicare, this revamped version of Medicaid 87
could be funded by a payroll tax, with the existing Medicaid funding
base covering much of the cost and personal savings or private insurance
funding the deductible. 188 The deductible period would discourage ex-
cessive reliance on the public subsidy of long-term care. 189 Moreover,
private insurance on this term-limited basis would likely be more afford-
able than is presently the case even when purchased later in life. As a
result, more people would be likely to enroll. It would still be necessary
to have a means-tested subsidy for those who could not afford long-term
care during the deductible period, but the economic and psychological
disadvantages of voluntary impoverishment described in this article
would deter significant abuse of the means testing rules for such a lim-
ited advantage. 190
A serious potential problem with this approach is that it may con-
tinue to force spend down to poverty level by those middle-class people
who are already fairly poor and, thus, unable to afford insurance.' 9 1 One
way to address this problem would be to raise the resource levels for
Medicaid eligibility so that spend down does not leave people so impov-
erished.192 This relief could be combined with repeal of the estate recov-
ery rules in this context as well.193 The denial of a poor person's right to
leave a modest inheritance to his loved ones at a time when the super
wealthy are being excused from paying estate taxes is simply uncon-
consonant with the ideal of equality. I recognize, however, that differences in economic status
will almost inevitably produce disparities in treatment.
186 The estate recovery rules have arguably impeded the development of public-private
partnerships similar to those described by Rivlin and Wiener. See Pasaba & Barnes, supra
note 55, at 550-52 (describing the negative effect of the OBRA '93 requirements of asset
recovery programs by the states on emerging public-private partnership long-term care
projects while maintaining that such partnerships remain viable).
187 Rivlin and Wiener prefer to call this new insurance program an expansion of Medi-
care. See CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY, supra note 6, at 244.
188 Id. at 246. Rivlin and Wiener assert that a three percent payroll tax would finance a
public insurance program for long term care and that "continuing the current Medicaid pro-
gram would cost at least half that much." Id. They argue that other sources of revenue should
be considered, including "state revenues, estate taxes, 'sin' taxes and reduction in other medi-
care spending. id. at 219 The problems with relying on payroll taxes to pay for publicly
financed long term care reform are that we already have a surfeit of payroll taxes and such
taxes are regressive. Id. at 218-19.
189 Id. at 212-14
190 See supra Part V.
191 See Rein, supra note 2, it 293-94 (describing this problem in the context of partner-
ship programs used in Connecticut and New York).
192 Id. (citing evidence that modest increases in the exempt resource level would create
only minor increases in Medicaid expenditures).
193 Margolis, supra note 2, at 308 ( "Estate recovery should be eliminated as unfair, inef-
fective, and a waste of administrative resources.").
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scionable.194 Another avenue that could be available to everyone but
which is likely to be utilized most by the lower middle class is family
home care during the deductible period. In effect the family could avoid
spend down by providing the care themselves during the deductible pe-
riod. Obviously, strict policing mechanisms would be needed to prevent
abuse of the rule.' 95 Recurring certification by the person's physician of
continuing disability is one mechanism that might work.
CONCLUSION
Voluntary impoverishment to obtain government benefits degrades
the elderly population. 96 Some people even consider the practice dis-
honest or discreditable. Nonetheless, proponents of the practice contend
that voluntary relinquishment of one's property is simply rational behav-
ior. It is seen as simply bowing to the inevitable. 197 Whether we accept
the practice or deplore it, we must recognize its existence as a fact and
understand that, in the absence of intervention, the practice will probably
expand. While the rules could be tightened to make the practice more
difficult, it is unlikely to go away as long as our system spreads the costs
associated with chronic illness among the elderly so unevenly. Moreo-
ver, it is unlikely that the rule makers can outsmart the planners. As our
tax system has shown, planners are amazingly adaptable and creative in
deflecting and exploiting whatever rules the government develops. In
the end the ones who are penalized are the "unlucky, the meek, and the
lawyer averse. . ". ."198 The solution lies in leveraging the inherent disad-
vantages of involuntary impoverishment by reducing the risk of cata-
strophic loss in the event long-term care is required.
It is a commonly accepted truth that America is a society for the
young. The realities of aging, decline, and death are often hidden from
view in our society. To the extent that we address the topic of death and
dying we prefer the image of the graceful death after a brief illness.
Sadly, the truth is that many people die by inches. They cling to what
appears a meager life well past the point where a disinterested observer
might conclude that death is preferable. They cling to life with a fear-
194 See Dobris, supra note 2, at 29 ( "[Mlany of the arguments in favor of allowing people
to retain some assets while qualifying for Medicaid are similar to arguments against death
taxation.").
195 Id. ("The key problem with funding home care is the concern that vouchers would be
used to pay family members for home care they have been providing for free.").
196 The same has been said of spend down rules. See Kapp, supra note 58, at 743.
("Forcing older persons to achieve wealth and then prove poverty deprives them of a measure
of basic human dignity, and society should not condone such mean-spirited public policy.").
197 Frank, supra note 2, at 29.
198 Dobris, supra note 2, at 28. Dobris also asserts that "any government system that
yields to legal manipulation by distinguishing between those who obtain sophisticated counsel
and those who do not is socially unwholesome." Id. at 3 1.
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some tenacity that is also an expensive proposition. Is there fault in this?
Should the sickly old people in this country surrender to death more
readily? Who can judge this? The simple fact remains that at present
they do not wish to "go gentle into that good night."' 199 In time, the
practice of voluntary euthanasia may replace the practice of voluntary
impoverishment as a means for addressing life's last phase. For today,
however, the reality is that old people want to live even if they appear to
not live well. They "rage against the dying of the light. '20 0 Our health
care system must address this passion for life in some more direct and
rational fashion than is presently the case.
The practice of voluntary impoverishment to obtain Medicaid is too
degrading, too unevenly available, and too expensive to receive our con-
tinued countenance. But the problems it addresses cannot be swept aside
by mere government fiat. Indeed, the rise of the practice of voluntary
impoverishment is clear testimony to the seriousness and intransigence
of the problem of paying for long-term care for the disabled elderly. A
solution must be crafted to give the middle-class elderly the incentive to
bear much of their long-term care costs while limiting their risks of cata-
strophic loss. There is a middle path that achieves this end. Whether we
have the political will to take this path remains an open question. If we
do not, the practice of voluntary impoverishment to obtain government
benefits will become as American as apple pie.
199 Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night, in IN COUNTRY SLEEP AND OTHER
POEMS 18 (1952).
200 See id.
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